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Abstract 
Leading theory hypothesizes that age deficits in decision making may rise as the complexity 
of decision-related information increases. This suggests that older adults would benefit 
relative to young adults from simplification of information used to inform decision making. 
Participants indicated political, nutritional and medical preferences and then chose between 
politicians, foods and medicines. The amount of information presented was systematically 
varied but age differences were largely similar for simple and complex trials. Paradoxically, 
the data showed that decisions based on simpler information could be less aligned with 
participant’s preferences than decisions based on more complex information. Further 
analyses suggested that participants may have been responding purely on the basis of their 
most valued preferences and that when information about those preferences was not 
presented, decision making became poorer. Contrary to our expectations, simplification of 
information by exclusion may therefore hinder decision making and may not particularly help 
older adults. 
Keywords: aging, decision-making, complexity, executive functioning, applied 
psychology 
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Influences of Complexity on Decision Making in Young and Older Adults 
Higher life expectancy (Salomon et al., 2012) and the maturity of the WWII ‘baby 
boom’ generation (Van Bavel & Reher, 2013) has led to a large increase in the age of people 
in positions of power in business and politics (cf. Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015). It is 
therefore becoming ever more important to understand age-related change and its impact on 
individuals and society, particularly because of the large range of cognitive differences 
shown between young and older adults (e.g., Craik & Salthouse, 2008; Deary et al., 2009). 
These factors have led to an exponential increase in cognitive aging research (Salthouse, 
2010), including research into the role of aging in decision making (Strough, Löckenhoff, & 
Hess, 2015). The process of making decisions is crucial to everyday functioning such as 
deciding who to vote for, which foods are best to eat and what medicine to take. However, 
there has been less cognitive research evaluating older adults’ decision making in these 
applied contexts and this has been identified as an area in particular need of further research 
(Carstensen & Hartel, 2006). 
Aspects of executive functioning/cognitive control that are involved in decision 
making have been shown to decline in healthy older adults. Decision making benefits from 
increased working memory (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003) and inhibitory control (Del 
Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2010) and leading theories of age-related cognitive 
decline propose age deficits in working memory (e.g. Craik, 2000; Craik & Byrd, 1982) and 
inhibition (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988) as well as executive functioning in general (e.g., 
Allain et al., 2007; Buckner, 2004; West, 1996). Broadly, the role of executive functioning in 
decision making (e.g., Del Missier, Mäntylä, & Bruine de Bruin, 2012) has been used to 
explain many age-related deficits that are found in decision-making literature (see Brand & 
Markowitsch, 2010; Denburg & Hedgcock, 2015, for reviews). 
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The influence of task complexity has been linked to executive functioning in age 
comparisons of decision making, usually showing age deficits for tasks of increasing 
complexity (e.g., see Brand & Markowitsch, 2010; Peters & Bruine de Bruin, 2012, for 
reviews). For example, during complex decision making, older adults (relative to young 
adults) can show difficulty applying rules and greater susceptibility to the way decision-
related material is framed/presented (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007).  Similarly, 
Finucane et al., (2002) and Finucane, Mertz, Slovic, and Schmidt, (2005) showed that when 
information needed to be processed before decisions could be made (e.g., combinations of 
percentages weighed against one another), age deficits were particularily large and they also 
showed greater inconsistency in older adults’ decisions relative to young adults’ decisions 
when the same information was presented in different ways (e.g., ordered vs. unordered). 
Most relevant to the current study are age differences in decision strategies that 
investigate complexity due to the amount of information utilized by young and older adults. 
Besedeš, Deck, Sarangi, and Shor (2012) showed that decisions involving more information 
led to greater age deficits than decisions involving less information. A variety of studies on 
information seeking show that older adults seek less information than do young adults, 
indicating that they do this in order to minimize the use of executive functioning (Mather, 
2006). In a decision-making simulation, management teams of older adults engaged in less 
information searching than management teams of young adults (Streufert, Pogash, Piasecki, 
& Post, 1990), older women have been shown to seek less information than young women 
when making medical-treatment decisions about breast cancer (Meyer, Russo, & Talbot, 
1995), and in a more abstract task involving evaluation of diamonds, older adults sought less 
information than did young adults (Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007). A review by Liu, 
Wood, and Hanoch (2015) also indicated that older adults prefer making decisions with fewer 
options. In contrast to the above, some research has shown similar age deficits in decisions 
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based on more or less information (Finucane et al., 2005) and similar information seeking in 
young and older adults (e.g., Queen, Hess, Ennis, Dowd, & Grühn, 2012). However, overall 
the literature suggests that older adults improve relative to young adults when decisions are 
simpler. 
In the current study, we aimed to evaluate if young and older adults could make better 
decisions when less information was presented by manipulating the amount of information 
available for decision making across simple and complex trials. We are only aware of five 
aging studies with such a manipulation, three which showed that age deficits increased with 
complexity (larger age deficits for more complex trials, Besedeš et al., 2012; Hanoch et al., 
2011; Frey et al., 2015) and two that did not (Finucane et al., 2005; Queen et al., 2012). 
Despite the mixed results, the theoretical consensus reviewed above seems to be that older 
adults should perform disproportionally worse as decision complexity increases. Peters and 
Bruine de Bruin (2012) argued that policy makers and practitioners seeking to inform older 
adults’ decisions should provide simpler materials that are summarized into fewer key points. 
This is an important issue to resolve as it is essential that older adults are provided with the 
best opportunity to make optimum decisions. 
In previous studies that manipulated complexity, simpler trials often involved a 
reasonably large amount of information. Besedeš et al. (2012) had four options, each with 
multiple attributes and Finucane et al. (2005) and Hanoch et al. (2011) had at least three 
options, each with multiple attributes. All of these studies involved decisions based on new 
information learned in the experiment that may have placed larger demands on working 
memory. Even the least difficult measure of working memory span (forward digit span) in a 
meta-analysis by Bopp and Verhaeghen (2005) shows mean span scores of seven items for 
older adults. This suggests that older adults’ working memory capacity may have been 
exceeded, even in simple trials. The study by Queen et al. (2012) had participants base their 
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decisions on their own preferences which would have reduced memory requirement, 
nonetheless their simpler trials still involved five options, each with five attributes and the 
attributes were only visible one at a time (requiring additional mental retention). Finally, the 
study by Frey et al. (2015) had just two options in their simple trials but participants made 
their decisions after sampling multiple pieces of numerical information which was allowed to 
vary between young and older adults (their study was more focused on strategy use than 
complexity). In the current study, decisions involved just two options with simple trials 
consisting of one to three attributes based on participants’ real-life preferences. Overall, the 
current study provided the optimal conditions for older adults to perform well in simple trials, 
therefore evaluating the potential for information simplification to reduce age deficits in 
decision making. 
Method 
Design 
Young and older participants filled in basic data about their political, nutritional and medical 
preferences in three conditions. Following each of these, they made a series of binary 
decisions about politicians, food and medicines. For each condition there were simple 
decisions based on minimal information and complex decisions based on multiple pieces of 
information. The overall design was age (young, older; between participants) x topic1 
(political, nutritional and medical; within participants) x complexity (simple, complex; within 
participants). 
Participants 
 
1 It should be noted that the political, nutritional and medical topics not only had different subject 
matter, but that they also addressed the complexity manipulation in different ways. Therefore, the reader should 
be cautious of interpreting topic effects due to subject matter alone. 
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Thirty young adults (22 female) aged 19–30 years (M = 24.4, SD = 3.3) and 30 
healthy older adults (19 female) aged 61–82 years (M = 71.7, SD = 4.5) took part in the 
experiment. Young participants were recruited from Nottingham Trent University and 
reported no issues with eyesight, hearing or reading. Older participants were recruited from 
the university’s Trent Aging Panel which is populated by the local community; their self-
rated corrected eyesight, hearing, and general health averaged 3.8, 4.0, and 3.9 (equivalent to 
“good”), respectively, on a five-point scale (1 = “very poor” to 5 = “very good”). All 
participants provided written informed consent and the study was approved by Nottingham 
Trent University’s research ethics committee. 
To assess cognitive functioning, participants completed the Digit Symbol Substitution 
test from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (Wechsler, 1981) as a measure of 
processing speed and the multiple choice part of the Mill Hill vocabulary test (Raven, Raven, 
& Court, 1988) as a measure of crystallized intelligence. The results were consistent with the 
literature (e.g., Salthouse, 2010); young adults performed better than older adults at the speed 
task, t(58) = 9.44, p < .001, d = 2.44 (Myoung = 74.33, SDyoung = 9.25; Molder = 49.47, SDolder = 
11.07) and older adults performed better than young adults at the vocabulary task, t(58) = 
5.89, p < .001, d = 1.52 (Myoung = 18.90, SDyoung = 2.91; Molder = 23.57, SDolder = 3.22). 
Materials and Procedure 
 All materials were presented digitally on a desktop PC running OpenSesame software 
(Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). The three conditions within the topic factor (political, 
nutritional and medical) were presented in blocks and were fully counterbalanced in their 
order of presentation. Participants were allowed to rest between each task and condition. 
 Political condition. Initially, participants were asked how they would assign £100 
million of government spending between education, healthcare and defense. Three boxes 
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were provided and participants typed in three values (in millions) that added up to 100. 
Assigning exactly 1/3 to each sector was prohibited to aid later analysis (see Table 1 for 
means, which show largely similar preferences for young and older adults). 
Table 1 
Mean Initial Preferences for Young (Y) and Older (O) adults for each Experimental 
Condition 
Condition Preferences Measure 
Age 
Group Mean SD 
Political  Education Spending Y 37.73 7.263 
  O 34.83 5.983 
 Health Spending Y 42.73 10.017 
  O 41.03 7.384 
 Defence Spending Y 19.53 10.471 
  O 24.13 8.513 
     
Nutritional  Energy Rank Y 2.23 1.612 
  O 2.87 1.502 
 Total Fat Rank Y 2.70 1.489 
  O 3.43 1.612 
 Carbohydrates Rank Y 3.97 1.402 
  O 3.53 1.432 
 Fibre Rank* Y 4.73 1.388 
  O 3.83 1.392 
 Protein Rank Y 3.10 1.470 
  O 2.87 1.737 
 Salt Rank Y 4.27 1.437 
  O 4.47 1.943 
     
Medical Joint/Muscle Pain Unpleasantness Y 5.03 2.092 
  O 5.03 2.236 
 Nausea Unpleasantness Y 7.20 1.540 
  O 6.23 2.388 
 Headache Unpleasantness* Y 6.07 1.982 
  O 5.00 1.912 
 Drowsiness Unpleasantness Y 3.53 2.177 
  O 3.47 2.636 
*Age difference significant at p <.05 
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 Following the assignments, participants were asked to choose between two 
politicians. In the complex trials, education, health and defense voting choices were indicated 
for each politician (see Figure 1). In the simple trials, information about just one spending 
sector (e.g., just education voting) was provided. Thirty complex trials and 18 simple trials 
were constructed. Only percentages of 20, 40 and 60 were used to indicate the proportion of 
votes each politician made in favor of more or less spending in a given sector. For complex 
trials, the voting behavior always added up so that a given politician was voting for more 
spending exactly 1/3 of the time (i.e., the three percentages indicated for more spending 
always added up to 100 and the three percentages indicated for less spending always added 
up to 200; see Figure 1). The above constraints meant that there were six ways to assign a 
given voting profile for a politician. This meant that there were five ways of assigning a 
different profile for the opposite politician. Therefore 6x5 = 30 complex trials were 
presented. For simple trials, there were only six ways to assign different percentages to each 
politician and this was done for each of the three spending sectors, resulting in 18 simple 
trials. During the experiment, complex and simple trials were presented randomly, intermixed 
in a single block. At the end of the block, participants were asked again to assign their £100 
million spending budget. This was to later check that participants had not forgotten their 
initial assignments.  
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Politician 1 
 
 Politician 2 
Voted in favour of more education 
spending 20% of the time and in favour of 
less education spending 80% of the time. 
 
Voted in favour of more healthcare 
spending 40% of the time and in favour of 
less healthcare spending 60% of the time. 
 
Voted in favour of more defence spending 
40% of the time and in favour of less 
defence spending 60% of the time. 
 Voted in favour of more education spending 
20% of the time and in favour of less 
education spending 80% of the time. 
 
Voted in favour of more healthcare spending 
20% of the time and in favour of less 
healthcare spending 80% of the time. 
 
Voted in favour of more defence spending 
60% of the time and in favour of less defence 
spending 40% of the time. 
 
Food Product 1 
 
 Food Product 2 
Energy (Amber) 
Total Fat (Red) 
Carbohydrates (Green) 
Fiber (Amber) 
Protein (Red) 
Salt (Green) 
 Energy (Amber) 
Total Fat (Amber) 
Carbohydrates (Red) 
Fiber (Red) 
Protein (Green) 
Salt (Green) 
 
Medicine 1 Side Effects 
 
 Medicine 2 Side Effects 
2 in 10 people may experience joint/muscle 
pain 
2 in 10 people may experience nausea 
6 in 10 people may experience headaches 
4 in 10 people may experience drowsiness 
 2 in 10 people may experience joint/muscle pain 
2 in 10 people may experience nausea 
4 in 10 people may experience headaches 
6 in 10 people may experience drowsiness 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a complex trial in the political condition (top), the nutritional condition (middle) 
and the medical condition (bottom). Simple trials were presented identically but with items removed from each 
option. The participant must press 1 or 2 on the keyboard to indicate their choice of the left or right option. The 
traffic-light colors in parenthesis for the nutritional condition are displayed in text here but were the font colors 
in the original experiment.  
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 Nutritional condition. In this condition participants initially ranked how important 
the following six nutritional properties of food were to them personally: Energy, Total Fat, 
Carbohydrates, Fibre, Protein and Salt. The factors were listed on the screen and participants 
ranked them from one to six with one being the most important to them and six being the 
least important to them (see Table 1 for means, which show largely similar preferences for 
young and older adults). This was done by using the number keys after clicking a box next to 
each property. All ranks from one to six had to be used once and only once.2 
 Following the rankings, participants were asked to choose between two foods ‘which 
tasted and looked the same but had different nutritional properties’. The nutritional 
properties were listed in two grids (see Figure 1) and a traffic-light system was used to 
indicate if a property was good (green font), average (amber font) or bad (red font). This was 
done to avoid using specific measurements of quantity that participants may not be familiar 
with. Additionally, if one participant thought more fat was good and another thought less fat 
was good, the traffic light system would cause them to both respond in the same way as long 
as they both viewed fat with similar levels of importance based on rank. 
In the complex trials, information about all six nutritional properties was presented for 
each food. There were always two good, two average and two bad properties for each food. 
Forty-eight different combinations were created and a random subset of 24 of these was 
selected separately for each participant. In the simple trials, information about three 
nutritional properties was presented for each food (the same three properties were always 
used for both foods in a given trial). There was always one good, one average and one bad 
 
2 One young and two older participants were excluded from analyses involving nutrition because they 
did not rank their preferences correctly. 
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property for each food. Again, 48 different combinations were created and a random subset of 
24 of these was selected separately for each participant. During the experiment, complex and 
simple trials were presented randomly, intermixed in a single block. At the end of the block, 
participants ranked the nutritional properties again. 
Medical condition. In this condition, participants initially rated their opinion about 
four medicinal side effects: joint/muscle pain, nausea, headaches, and drowsiness. They were 
presented with the four side effects and rated each of them on a 10- point Likert scale from 1 
slightly unpleasant to 10 extremely unpleasant (see Table 1 for means, which show largely 
similar preferences for young and older adults). 
Following the ratings, participants were asked to choose between two ‘equally 
effective medicines’ based on their side effects. The side effects for the medicines were 
presented in two grids (see Figure 1). Each side effect was listed as the number of people out 
of 10 who experience this side effect (e.g., ‘2 in 10 people may experience nausea’). In the 
complex trials, all four side effects were presented for each medicine. In the simple trials, two 
side effects were presented for each medicine and these were always the same two types of 
side effect for both medicines. 
For the complex trials, the numbers out of 10 for the four side effects were always a 2, 
another 2, a 4 and a 6 (therefore, the sum frequency of the combined four side effects was 
always 14 out of 40). For a given medicine this resulted in 12 possible combinations across 
the four side effects leaving 11 possible different combinations for the other medicine in the 
same trial. This resulted in 12x11 = 132 possible complex trials and a random subset of 24 of 
these was selected separately for each participant. For the simple trials, the numbers out of 10 
for the two side effects presented always summed to eight (i.e., either a 2 and a 6, or a 4 and 
another 4). This resulted in six possible combinations of different side-effect frequencies 
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across the two medicines and there were also six ways to choose two out of the four side 
effects to present. Therefore, 6x6 =36 different simple trials were possible and a random 
subset of 24 of these was selected separately for each participant. During the experiment, 
complex and simple trials were presented randomly, intermixed in a single block. At the end 
of the block, participants rated the unpleasantness of the side effects again. 
Results 
Scoring 
 Political condition. The proportion of money that the participants assigned to each 
spending sector was compared to the proportion of the time each politician voted in favor of 
more spending in that sector. Given that in the complex trials the politicians always voted for 
more spending exactly 1/3 of the time, the proportion of their spending in each sector was 
comparable to the proportion of money the participant would assign to that sector. The root 
mean square error (RMSE) was calculated between the participant’s spending habits and each 
of the two politicians’ spending habits for each trial. Decision accuracy for each trial was 
determined by establishing if the participant chose the politician with the smaller RMSE in 
relation to the participant’s spending. Trials where RMSE was equal for the two politicians 
were excluded from the accuracy measurement (5% of complex and 17% of simple trials). 
The overall accuracy proportion and the mean RMSE between the participant’s spending and 
their chosen politicians were dependent variables. These values were calculated separately for 
the participant’s preferences at the start and end of the block. This was done to confirm that 
participants were not forgetting their initial choices which may have had a greater impact on 
older adults who typically have poorer memory performance than do young adults (Naveh-
Benjamin & Ohta, 2012). Additionally, a separate RMSE difference between the reported 
start and end preferences was calculated for each participant. 
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 Nutritional condition. The ranks of the six nutritional properties chosen by the 
participants were used to compute a score for each food in each trial. Firstly, the participants’ 
chosen ranks were inverted so that 6 was the most important and 1 was the least important. 
Then for each food, good properties were given a score of +1, average properties a score of 0 
and bad properties a score of -1. A score for each nutritional property was computed by 
multiplying the participant’s inverted rank by the score for that property. Then a score for 
each food was computed by summing the scores for each property.3 Therefore, properties 
considered more important by the participant would have a greater influence on the overall 
score for a given food and higher scores would correspond to a more desirable food. The food 
scores were used to compute the optimal (accurate) choice for a participant on a given trial. 
Similar to the political condition, the overall accuracy and mean scores for the chosen food 
were computed as dependent variables separately for the nutritional property ranks indicated 
by the participant at the start of the block and for the nutritional property ranks indicated by 
the participant at the end of the block (a separate RMSE difference between the raw start and 
end ranks was also calculated for each participant). Trials resulting in identical scores for 
each food were excluded from the accuracy measurement (6% of complex and 6% of simple 
trials had no correct response and were excluded from the accuracy analysis). 
 Medical condition. The ratings for the unpleasantness of each side effect indicated by 
the participants were used to establish the unpleasantness of each medicine in a trial. Firstly, 
the participants’ ratings were weighted so that they summed to one. (e.g., if a participant 
rated joint/muscle pain, nausea headaches, and drowsiness as 1, 2, 9 and 10 respectively then 
each value would be divided by the overall sum to give 0.05, 0.09, 0.41, and 0.45). Likewise, 
 
3 For example, if a participant ranked Energy, Total Fat, Carbohydrates, Fibre, Protein and Salt as 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively, and if these properties for a given food were good (+1), good (+1), average (0), 
average (0), bad (-1) and bad (-1) respectively, the overall score for that food would be calculated as follows. 
The participant’s ranks would be inverted (e.g., 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) then multiplied by the values assigned to each 
property with the resulting numbers summed together: 6*(1) + 5*(1) + 4*(0) + 3*(0) + 2*(-1) + 1*(-1) = 8.  
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for each medicine, the frequency of occurrence of each side effect was weighted so that the 
sum of all the frequencies was 1 (e.g., 1/10, 2/10, 4/10 and 5/10 would be 0.08, 0.16, 0.33 and 
0.42, respectively). This allowed comparison between a participant’s preferences and a 
medicine to be made across a fixed range of 0-1. The RMSE was then calculated between the 
weighted participants’ ratings and the weighted frequencies of occurrence of each side effect 
for each medicine for each trial. An accurate response was established by determining if the 
participant chose the medicine with the maximum RMSE compared to their preferences (note 
that we chose the maximum RMSE because participants were trying to avoid unpleasant side 
effects, unlike the political condition where participants tried to choose a politician with 
similar views). For the complex trials, the weights were based on all four ratings; for the 
simple trials, the weights were based on the two ratings relevant to side effects presented 
(e.g., if just nausea and headaches were relevant with ratings of 2 and 9, respectively, then 
their weights would be 0.18 and 0.82, respectively). Again, similar to the political and 
nutritional conditions, overall accuracy and mean RMSE between the participants rating and 
their chosen medicine for each trial were calculated separately for ratings made at the start 
and end of the block (a separate RMSE difference between the raw start and end ratings was 
also calculated for each participant). Trials resulting in identical RMSE values for both 
medicines were excluded from the accuracy measurement (8% of complex and 5% of simple 
trials had no correct response and were excluded from the accuracy analysis).  
Analysis 
 Throughout the article, standard null hypothesis tests are accompanied by an 
estimated Bayes Factor implemented through JASP computer software (Love et al., 2015). 
The Bayes Factor (BF10) provides an odds ratio for the alternative/null hypotheses (values < 1 
favor the null hypothesis and values > 1 favor the alternative hypothesis). For example, a 
BF10 of 0.40 would indicate that the null hypothesis is 2.5 times more likely than the 
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alternative hypothesis (see Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). All Bayesian t-tests are two-tailed using 
the standard Cauchy prior width of 0.707. 
 Overall analysis. The only comparable measure across the topic factor was the 
accuracy of each decision with respect to each participants’ stated preferences. This was 
assessed in a 2 (age; young, older) x 3 (topic; political, nutritional, medical) x 2 (complexity; 
complex, simple) mixed ANOVA (see Figure 2, for means) where accuracy was determined 
by the preferences indicated by participants at the start of a block.4 Young adults made more 
accurate choices based on their preferences than did older adults, F(1, 55) = 9.98, MSE = 
0.050, p = .003, ƞp2= .154, BF10 = 11.172. Participants responded with similar decision 
accuracy across the three topics for the standard, F < 1, but not for the Bayesian, BF10 = 
1.579 x 107, analyses: performance was highest in the medical condition then the political 
condition and then the nutritional condition. Surprisingly, participants were more accurate for 
complex trials involving more information in each decision than for simple trials involving 
less information in each decision, F(1, 55) = 94.55, MSE = 0.016, p < .001, ƞp2= .632, BF10 > 
1015. Age did not interact with complexity, F < 1, BF10 = 0.381, or with topic, F(2, 110) = 
2.12, MSE = 0.038, p = .125, ƞp2= .037, BF10 = 3.767, and there was no triple interaction 
between age, topic and complexity, F(2, 110) = 2.17, MSE = 0.011, p = . 119, ƞp2= .038, BF10 
= 0.321. There was an interaction between topic and complexity, F(2, 110) = 53.43, MSE = 
0.011, p < .001, ƞp2= .493, BF10 = 8.721 x 107, which is explored below. The same patterns of 
significance were found when basing accuracy from the participants’ preferences given at the 
end of each block, indicating that the observed patterns were not due to participants 
forgetting their reported preferences.   
 
4The ANOVA was also completed with the order in which topics were presented as a six-level, 
between-participants factor. There were some significant interactions involving order; however when the data 
were analyzed with just the first topic the participant completed (which made topic a between-participants 
factor), the main effects and interactions were the same as the presented ANOVA.  
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Political Condition 
 
Nutritional Condition 
 
Medical Condition 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of accurate responses (0.5 = chance) for young and older adults when making 
complex and simple decisions based on their political (top) nutritional (middle) and medical (bottom) 
preferences. Error bars are ± 95%CI.  
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Political condition. A 2 (age; young, older) x 2 (complexity; complex, simple) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted on the accuracy of political decisions based on participants’ 
preferences indicated at the start of a block. There was no main effect of age, F(1, 58) = 1.14, 
MSE = 0.042, p = .291, ƞp2= .019, BF10 = 0.550. Participants were more accurate for complex 
trials than for simple trials, F(1, 58) = 90.39, MSE = 0.019, p < .001, ƞp2= .609, BF10 = 2.806 
x 1011. There was no interaction between age and complexity, F(1, 58) = 3.00, MSE = 0.019, 
p = .088, ƞp2= .049, BF10 = 1.077. The actual RMSE data were also analyzed but because 
RMSE was calculated differently for complex and for simple trials, only the effects involving 
age were meaningful to report. T-tests showed that older adults performed better than young 
adults (lower RMSE) for complex trials, t(50.27) = 2.28, p = .027, d = 0.59, BF10 = 2.227, 
(Myoung = 14.43, SDyoung = 2.91; Molder = 12.97, SDolder = 1.92), and there were no age deficits 
for simple trials, t <1, d = 0.15, BF10 = 0.303, (Myoung = 15.05, SDyoung = 2.99; Molder = 15.52, 
SDolder = 3.32). These results may differ from the accuracy data because trials were excluded 
from the accuracy data when there was no correct choice but the RMSE data include all trials 
and the RMSE was calculated for whichever option was chosen, regardless of whether or not 
it was correct. Additionally, there was no evidence that older adults were changing their mind 
about their political preferences throughout the experiment due to age-related memory 
impairment: The difference between a participant’s preferences at the beginning of the 
political block and their preferences at the end of the political block (also based on RMSE, 
lower is better) was calculated and compared for young and older adults and there was no 
significant effect (t < 1, d = 0.07, BF10 = 0.270, Myoung = 1.75, SDyoung = 4.06; Molder = 1.49, 
SDolder = 3.35).  
The fact that participants performed better for complex trials than for simple trials is 
interesting because we would naturally predict the opposite. However, there is a factor that 
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could influence participants’ behavior for simple trials, namely that the two politicians to 
choose from were not equated in their spending voting as they were for complex trials. In 
complex trials, both politicians always voted for more spending exactly 1/3 of the time so 
more spending in one sector can be cancelled out by less spending in another. For simple 
trials, where each politician’s spending for only one sector is presented, there is always one 
politician who votes for more public spending than the other. The data were analyzed to see 
how often a given participant chose the more generous (higher spending voting) politician for 
simple trials. One-sample t-tests showed that both young and older adults selected the more 
generous politician more than half the time (tyoung(29) = 7.80, p < .001, d = 5.23, BF10 =9.971 
x 105, Myoung = 0.68, SDyoung = 0.13; tolder(29) = 8.29, p < .001, d = 4.63, BF10 = 3.156 x 10
6, 
Molder = 0.74, SDolder = 0.16). There was also no significant age difference in the choice of the 
more generous politician, t(58) = 1.46, p = .151, d = 0.38, BF10 = 0.636. Therefore the 
participants have a natural bias that hinders performance for simple trials in the political 
condition so this could explain the superior performance in complex trials. However, this 
problem does not occur for the nutritional and medical conditions where the simple trials 
have more than one item which allows the two options to be balanced. 
 Nutritional condition. A 2 (age; young, older) x 2 (complexity; complex, simple) 
mixed ANOVA was conducted on the accuracy of nutritional decisions based on participants’ 
preferences indicated at the start of a block. Young adults were more accurate than were older 
adults, F(1, 55) = 9.03, MSE = 0.055, p = .004, ƞp2= .141, BF10 = 7.119. There was no effect 
of complexity, F(1, 55) = 3.45, MSE = 0.009, p = .072, ƞp2= .059, BF10 = 0.706, although the 
numerical trend was in the predicted direction with better performance for simple trials than 
for complex trials. There was no interaction between age and complexity, F < 1, BF10 = 
0.466. The scores for each food chosen by a participant (see above for scoring system; higher 
is better) based on their preferences at the start of a block were analyzed but due to the fact 
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that scores were calculated differently for simple and complex trials, only effects involving 
age were meaningful to report. T-tests showed that older adults performed worse than young 
adults for complex trials, t(55) = 3.74, p < .001, d = 0.99, BF10 = 61.035 (Myoung = 1.70, 
SDyoung = 0.77; Molder = 0.69, SDolder = 1.21), but not for simple trials, t(48.51) = 1.42, p = 
.163, d = 0.38, BF10 = 0.622 (Myoung = 0.85, SDyoung = 0.73; Molder = 0.51, SDolder = 1.03). The 
difference between participants’ ranks at the start of the nutrition block and their ranks at the 
end of the nutrition block (based on RMSE, lower is better) were calculated and compared for 
young and older adults. Young adults were more consistent than were older adults, t(55) = 
2.15, p = .035, d = 0.57 , BF10 = 1.795, (Myoung = 0.58, SDyoung = 0.59; Molder = 0.99, SDolder = 
0.81). Therefore, the above analyses were repeated using accuracy and RMSE values based 
on the participants’ ratings provided at the end of the block and there were no changes in 
significance to those reported above. Overall, the nutritional condition behaves more like our 
predictions; complex trials were (numerically) more difficult than simple trials, age deficits 
were present and these deficits were more evident for the complex trials compared to the 
simple trials. 
 Medical condition. A 2 (age; young, older) x 2 (complexity; complex, simple) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted on the accuracy of medical decisions based on participants’ 
preferences indicated at the start of a block. Older adults were marginally less accurate than 
were young adults, F(1, 58) = 3.76, MSE = 0.029, p = .057, ƞp2= .061, BF10 = 1.170, accuracy 
was better for complex trials compared to simple trials, F(1, 58) = 99.38, MSE = 0.011, p < 
.001, ƞp2= .631, BF10 = 1.076 x 1012, and there was no interaction between age and 
complexity, F < 1, BF10 = 0.594. The RMSE data were also analyzed based on participants’ 
ratings of side effects indicated at the start of the medical block. Here participants were trying 
to avoid choosing a medicine which had side effects they did not like so higher RMSE 
between their ratings and their chosen medicine’s side effects reflects a better choice. The 
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RMSE was calculated differently for complex and simple trials so only effects involving age 
were meaningful to report. T-tests showed that there was no age difference for complex trials, 
t <1, d = 0.00, BF10 = 0.263 (Myoung = 0.16, SDyoung = 0.02; Molder = 0.16, SDolder = 0.03), and 
no age difference for simple trials, t <1, d = 0.18, BF10 = 0.311 (Myoung = 0.25, SDyoung = 0.05; 
Molder = 0.24, SDolder = 0.06). The difference between participants’ ratings at the start of the 
medical block and their ratings at the end of the medical block (based on RMSE, lower is 
better) were calculated and compared for young and older adults. Young adults were more 
consistent than were older adults, t(58) = 2.27, p = .027, d = 0.58 , BF10 = 2.179, (Myoung = 
0.71, SDyoung = 0.58; Molder = 1.17, SDolder = 0.95). Therefore, the above analyses were 
repeated using accuracy and RMSE values based on the participants’ ratings provided at the 
end of the block and there were no changes in significance to those reported above. Overall, 
there were no interesting effects of age in the medical condition. More interesting is the fact 
that participants were able to perform better for complex trials compared to simple trials. 
Unlike the political condition, there was no systematic bias in the simple trials that could 
have explained poor performance because the overall frequency of side effects was the same 
for both choices in simple trials. 
Single-dimension analysis. The higher performance for complex trials than for 
simple trials for the political and medical conditions was unexpected so further analyses were 
conducted based on whichever aspect of the participant’s preferences was most dominant. If, 
for example, a participant in the political condition cared much more about education than 
healthcare and defense, then they may have chosen their politician purely on the basis of 
education. This would lower their performance for some of the simple trials where education 
was not presented. The accuracy scores were recomputed assuming that participants were 
trying to respond on the basis of their most extreme preference, ignoring other items. All 
trials where a single-dimensional response could not be determined were excluded. This 
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occurred when the maximum preference was not presented in simple trials (24.5% of overall 
trials) or when a participant had multiple maximum preferences with contradicting ideal 
responses (7.5% of overall trials).  
A 2 (age; young, older) x 3 (topic; political, nutritional, medical) x 2 (complexity; 
complex, simple) x 2 (Accuracy measure; original measures outlined above, single 
dimensional) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the accuracy data (based on preferences 
indicated at the start of each condition) for only trials where a single dimensional measure of 
accuracy could be ascertained (i.e., regardless of accuracy measure, the exact same trials 
were used). Figure 3 shows the means. Violations of sphericity were accounted for by 
applying Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to degrees of freedom. Young adults responded 
more accurately than did older adults, F(1, 55) = 5.60, MSE = 0.089, p = .021, ƞp2= .092, 
BF10 = 3.371. Accuracy varied across topic; political > medical > nutritional, F(1.70, 93.53) 
= 9.19, MSE = 0.095, p < .001, ƞp2= .143, BF10 > 1015. There was no effect of complexity 
with standard statistics, F(1, 55) = 1.053, MSE = 0.025, p = .309, ƞp2= .019, but there was 
with Bayesian statistics, BF10 = 2.654 x 10
9. Interestingly, accuracy was higher when 
determined via a single dimensional measure as opposed to the original RMS/scoring 
measures described above, F(1, 55) = 63.10, MSE = 0.017, p < .001, ƞp2= .534, BF10 > 1015, 
indicating that participants were responding mainly on the basis of their maximum 
preferences. There were interactions between topic and accuracy measure, F(2, 110) = 21.39, 
MSE = 0.013, p < .001, ƞp2= .280, BF10 = 8.516 x 104, between complexity and accuracy 
measure, F(1, 55) = 99.92, MSE = 0.008, p < .001, ƞp2= .645, BF10 = 3.128 x 107, and a triple 
interaction between topic, complexity and accuracy measure, F(2, 110) = 31.26, MSE = 
0.008, p < .001, ƞp2= .362, BF10 = 1211: Figure 3 shows that the single-dimensional measures 
are at least as accurate as the original scoring measures, particularly for decisions involving 
fewer items. There was also an interaction between topic and complexity, F(2, 110) = 17.50, 
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MSE = 0.020, p < .001, ƞp2= .241, BF10 = 1.059 x 106, revealing a qualitatively similar pattern 
to the earlier data depicted in Figure 2 (but attenuated by the single-dimensional measure 
where simple trials were more accurate than complex trials). Finally, there were no 
interactions involving age, indicating that both age groups were responding similarly to the 
task (Fs < 2.06; Age x Topic BF10 = 7.246, Age x Complexity BF10 = 0.124, Age x Accuracy 
Measure BF10 = 0.190, Age x Topic x Complexity BF10 = 0.056, Age x Topic x Accuracy 
Measure BF10 = 0.069, Age x Complexity x Accuracy Measure BF10 = 0.023, Age x Topic x 
Complexity x Accuracy Measure BF10 = 2.759 x 10
-4). Table 2 shows the number of young 
and older adults performing more accurately with the original or single dimensional measures 
for each type of decision (participants with equal accuracy for both measures are excluded). 
A further ANOVA was conducted using just the single-dimensional measure, retaining the 
age, topic and complexity factors outlined above. Notably, there was no longer a main effect 
of age, F(1, 55) = 2.78, MSE = 0.055, p = .101, ƞp2= .048, BF10 = 1.364, and performance on 
simple trials now exceeded that of complex trials, F(1, 55) = 21.94, MSE = 0.013, p < .001, 
ƞp2= .048, BF10 = 1021. 
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Figure 3. Proportion of accurate responses (0.5 = chance) for young and older adults based on original scoring or single-dimensional (SD) scoring. The x-axis shows the 
decision types in order of the number of attributes (indicated in brackets) involved in each decision. Error bars are ± 95% CI. 
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Table 2  
Number of Young and Older Adults Showing Higher Accuracy with Original or Single-
Dimensional (SD) Scoring for Each Decision Type 
Age Group and 
Measure 
Political 
Simple (1)* 
 
Medical 
Simple (2) 
Nutritional 
Simple (3) 
Political 
Complex (3) 
Medical 
Complex (4) 
Nutritional 
Complex (6) 
 
Young Original 
Scoring 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
11 
 
6 
 
10 
 
14 
Young SD 
Scoring 
 
19 24 6 13 8 14 
Older Original 
Scoring 
 
0 1 7 12 3 13 
Older SD 
Scoring 
 
22 25 12 12 9 12 
*Number in brackets shows the number of attributes involved in each decision. 
Discussion 
The data showed that manipulating the amount of information involved in political, 
nutritional and medical decisions can have unpredictable effects and that policy makers and 
practitioners should be cautious when simplifying information that needs to be conveyed to 
aid decision making. Our main analyses showed that excluding information in order to 
simplify decisions sometimes led to a reduction in decision making performance. It appears 
that simplification sometimes led to the exclusion of information that was highly valued by 
participants, impeding performance: An accuracy measure assuming participants were 
responding purely on the basis of the most valued attributes explained the response data 
better than a measure assuming responses based on weighing multiple attributes against one 
another. Across conditions, simplification of information generally influenced both age 
groups similarly and was not particularly beneficial to older adults as initially hypothesized 
here, and elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Brand & Markowitsch, 2010). 
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Participants rated their political, medical and nutritional preferences across a range of 
attributes upon which later decisions were made. Our main analyses focused on a 
compensatory (Payne, 1976) accuracy measure that assumed decisions were made on the 
basis of weighing attributes against one another in order of their rated preferences. This 
mechanism of information integration has been hypothesized to be cognitively demanding 
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993) and we initially expected to enhance performance by 
reducing the number of attributes that needed to be compared against one another. As 
discussed in the introduction, reducing such demands was expected to disproportionally 
benefit older adults (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2012) and this did occur in 
the nutritional condition where we saw age deficits for complex trials but not for simple 
trials. However, the political and medical conditions showed better performance for complex 
trials, where more attributes needed to be weighed against one another, than for simple trials. 
Further analyses revealed that participants’ responses were better explained by a non-
compensatory mechanism. When we defined the accuracy of a decision on the basis of its 
congruence with each participant’s most valued attribute (i.e., single-dimensional/non-
compensatory decisions), this accuracy measure described the response data significantly 
better than the compensatory measure. Additionally, in contrast to Johnson (1990), there was 
no evidence that the use of compensatory mechanisms were more likely in young adults than 
in older adults: The Bayes factor provided ‘substantial’ evidence (Wetzels et al., 2011) in 
favor of the null hypothesis for the interaction between the compensatory and non-
compensatory measures and age group (although this conclusion can only be applied to the 
particular measures that were used in this study). Additionally, when the analysis was 
conducted with just the single-dimensional/non-compensatory measure, age differences were 
nonsignificant and performance was higher for simple than for complex trials. Both young 
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and older adults’ data was similarly explained better by the non-compensatory measure of 
accuracy which may have been driven by the simplicity of the tasks. 
One limitation of the current study is the breadth of topics used as stimuli. As we 
initially hypothesized that complexity would have similar effects in all contexts, we had 
aimed to demonstrate this as widely as possible by covering the applied topics of politics 
nutrition and medicine. This meant that because the complexity manipulation may not have 
been the same in each condition, participants may have had more prior knowledge of one 
topic than another and this is a factor known to influence age differences (e.g., Badham et al., 
2016). It may be necessary to move away from applied topics and to utilize abstract stimuli to 
evaluate more specific theoretical differences between young and older adults’ decision-
making processes.  
In the introduction, we argued that a potential limitation of earlier research 
investigating complexity manipulations with young and older adults was that simple trials 
often contained large amounts of information which may have still challenged older adults. 
The current study therefore used minimal amounts of information for assessment of decision 
making accuracy for simple trials. The single-dimensional measure of accuracy showed no 
significant age differences overall, indicating that the design was successfully simplified but 
it may be the case that the complex trials utilized were not complex enough to encourage 
compensatory processes and to challenge older adults. Nonetheless, there was little evidence 
of ceiling performance in the data and single-dimensional performance dropped as trials 
became more complex, demonstrating that complexity influenced difficulty. The interaction 
between accuracy measure and complexity also indicates that some participants may have 
adopted compensatory processing as trials became more complex (see also Table 2). 
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The applied nature of the study was partly utilized to aid simplification for older 
adults. As the decisions were based on participants’ real-life preferences there was no need 
for them to memorize experimental materials which may have disproportionately hindered 
older adults relative to young adults due to age-related memory deficits (Naveh-Benjamin & 
Ohta, 2012). By assessing preferences again at the end of each condition, it was possible to 
ascertain that age differences were not driven by forgetting the preferences. It has also been 
argued that real-world contexts help older adults engage with experimental materials and 
therefore provide a better assessment of their abilities (Peters & Bruine de Bruin, 2012). This 
may have been why age differences were not apparent in the final single dimensional 
analysis. 
There is some research to suggest that individuals do not necessarily make decisions 
based on their stated preferences (Lindberg, Gärling, & Montgomery, 1989). To briefly test 
for this in the current data, the variance was compared between young and older adult’s 
chosen options for each complexity level and for each condition. This would establish if there 
were age differences in consistency of responding to any preference. There was no evidence 
of age differences in consistency for simple trials (all BF10 < 0.6) or for complex trials (all 
BF10  <1.2) across the political, medical and nutritional conditions.  
A consistent feature of complexity on age differences in the literature was in studies 
of information seeking, where older adults generally sought less information than young 
adults before making decisions (see, Mather, 2006, for a review and see the current 
introduction for examples). Mather hypothesised that age-deficits in executive function may 
lead to seeking less information as older adults are less able to deal with higher executive 
demands. However, this finding is also consistent with age deficits in self-initiated processing 
(c.f., Craik & Byrd, 1982, where older adults perform better if given sufficent motivation) 
because older adults may be less motivated to continue seeking information. This could 
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potentially explain why there is inconsistency of age deficits in the literature when the 
amount of available information is manipulated;  just because the information is presented, it 
does not mean that older adults would have the motivation to utilise it. To account for this, 
future research may use manipulations of stimulus presentation to ensure that all available 
information is evaluated (e.g., forcing a response to each attribute before final evaluation - is 
this feature good or bad?). Another method to ensure compensatory processing could be to 
explicitly instruct participants to use all information presented; results from the memory 
literature have shown that older adults can utilise optimal strategies if encouraged to do so 
(e.g., Naveh-Benjamin, Brav, & Levy, 2007) and this may equally apply to decision making. 
Individual differences have also been shown to influence strategy use in decision 
making. Shiloh, Koren, and Zakay, (2001) showed links between compensatory decision-
making style and the subjective complexity of the decision. They argued that the perceived 
difficulty of a task may prevent decision making or lead to non-optimal decisions. This is a 
pertinent problem for older adults who often have subjective cognitive complaints which are 
not strongly related to their actual cognitive performance (see Burmester, Leathem, & 
Merrick, 2016, for a review) as they may begin to utilise simpler, and non-optimal decision-
making processes. This may be further problematic for old-old adults who typically have 
greater  subjective cognitive concerns (than older adults) that are also not linked to actual 
cognitive performance (Shmotkin, et al., 2013; Pearman, Hertzog, Gerstorf, 2014). Future 
ageing research on decision making should aim to include a subjective difficulty measure to 
account for age differences in cognitive confidence, especially if aiming to assess 
compensatory processing. 
Overall, the current data raises important issues relevant to the understanding of 
decision making. In contrast to prior theory suggesting that simplifying important decision-
making information would be particularly beneficial to older adults (Peters & Bruine de 
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Bruin, 2012), the current results indicate that the process of simplification via exclusion of 
information can hinder decision performance for all age groups. Our data shows that young 
and older adults’ decisions were explained well by a measure that assumed participants 
responded purely based on the single piece of information they valued most. Therefore, 
simplification that excludes this information could be particularly detrimental to 
performance. We recommend that professionals preparing information materials for older 
adults should be fully informed of the recipients’ preferences and priorities before 
simplification via exclusion and should seek other methods of simplification where possible 
such as improved organization of material about which decisions are to be made (c.f. Zaval et 
al. 2015). 
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